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[1] Role of the Principle of Separation of Powers in Independence of the 
Court and the Judges. The Latvian View. 
The principle of separation of powers plays a substantial role in a democratic 
state because it not only restricts discretion of the state power but also facilitates 
ensuring rights and freedoms of persons. This principle functions as a balance 
between branches of power by giving a possibility to one branch of power to restrict 
other branches of power in accordance with the authority conferred by the 
Constitution. Regardless the precise definition of authority of each branch of power 
established in the Constitution, a democratic state cannot be imagined without an 
institution that exercises constitutional review disregarding the fact whether it belongs 
to the judicial power or does not fall under the system of division of power. 
According to Article 85 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, this function in 
Latvia is exercised by the Constitutional Court, an institution belonging to the judicial 
power. 
The Constitutional Court can exercise constitutional review, namely, it can 
carry out its function of safeguarding the respect for the constitution and protecting 
human rights if it is genuinely independent from branches of power and institutions, 
the activates of which it controls. Such an independence of the Constitutional Court is 
ensured by observance of the principle of separation of powers. Effectiveness of 
ensuring of the basic task of the Constitutional Court, which is constitutional review, 
depends on the degree of independence of the court from other branches of power. 
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The answer to the question – how independent is, in fact, the Constitutional 
Court – is not given by norms included in the Constitution. The fact whether a 
genuine democracy prevails in the State and whether rights and freedoms of persons 
are protected in an efficient manner, depends on the actual cooperation (mutual 
relations) between branches of power and constitutional organs. 
In a democratic state the principle of the separation of power not only 
divides the branches of the state power, but also contains the requirement of their 
reciprocal cooperation, since the shared aim of all branches of power is the 
strengthening of democracy in the interests of the nation1. 
Only in such a state, in which the principle of the division of power 
guarantees the balance between the branches of state power and reciprocal control, 
preventing the tendencies of any branch to domineer, by promoting the moderation of 
power and thus ensuring a truly independent judiciary, the independence of judges 
can be ensured2. 
The aim of the division of power is to maintain the guarantees of person’s 
freedom, preclude the replacement of the model of state governed by the rule of law 
with an authoritarian regime or an autocracy of a single person. In a state governed by 
the rule of law the principle of the division of power guarantees the balance and 
reciprocal control between the branches of state power. This exactly gives the judges 
the possibility to fulfil their duties in a proper way3. 
Functioning, effectiveness and independence of the Constitutional Court is 
influenced by actual relations of the Court with the legislator and the executive power, 
these relations being regulated, at different degrees of concretization, in normative 
acts. These relations are related with appointment of justices, election of the President 
of the Constitutional Court, financial independence of the Court (development and 
administration of the budget), elaboration, adoption and amendment of normative acts 
regulating functioning of the Constitutional Court, competence of the Constitutional 
Court when assessing normative acts adopted by the legislator and the executive 
power. 
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[2] Independence of the Court and the Judges. Interpretation in the 
Constitutional Court’s Judgments 
In several its judgments, the Constitutional Court has analysed the 
requirement of independence of both, the court and a judge by clarifying the 
constitutional grounds and the content of the requirement, establishing aims and 
meaning of it, and assessing possible risks in relation to independence of the court and 
a judge. 
The Constitutional Court related the requirement of independence of the 
court and a judge not only with the principle of separation of powers but also the 
principle of the rule of law and the right to a fair court. 
The Constitutional Court has indicated that anyone with regard to whom 
justice is administered is interested in ensuring the independence of judges. This 
independence guarantees the safeguarding of the rule of law in the interests of the 
society and the state4. 
The independence of the court and the judges is not an end in itself, but only 
a means for ensuring and strengthening democracy and the rule of law, as well as a 
mandatory pre-condition for realising the rights to a fair trial5. 
When interpreting  the principle of independence of judges, the 
Constitutional Court has indicated by referring to international documents, that, first, 
the requirement set in the international documents for the independence of judges falls 
within the content of the right to a fair court6. Second, there are a number of 
documents developed by international institutions, which have been adopted so that 
the member states in their laws and practice would follow the principles they contain7. 
Even though these documents should be perceived only as guidelines, they impose 
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strict moral and political duties for the states and must be used as a means for 
clarifying the content of the criterion of judges’ independence8. 
When substantiating the content of independence, the Constitutional Court 
has made a research of and referred to case–law, constitutions and laws of other 
states9. 
 
[3] Institutional Independence of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court, when analysing the constitutional grounds, aims 
and significance of the independence of the judge, already indicated that it is 
impossible to ensure the necessary independence of the judge, unless the judiciary 
itself as a whole is not free from unjustified influence or the political pressure exerted 
by the executive power or the legislator10. Independence of the Constitutional Court 
and its justices depends on relations of the Court with the executive power and the 
legislator. 
 
[3.1] Constitutional Court’s Financial and Administrative Autonomy 
Independence of the Court is related with the resources needed to ensure the 
functioning of the judiciary. This includes: 
1) providing to the judges an appropriate personal security and 
remuneration; 
2) setting an adequate number of judges, appropriate for the 
number of cases to be examined; 
ensuring to the courts the necessary staff support and technical means11. 
 
The Constitutional Court has indicated that a reasonable compromise must 
be found between the guarantees of the judiciary and the budget possibilities. To 
ensure such balance, it is necessary to ensure collaboration between branches of the 
state power, namely the legislator, prior to taking decisions on the functioning of 
courts – both on issues linked to the budget, as well as other issues related to the 
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realisation of the functions of the courts, must give a possibility to the judiciary or an 
independent institution representing the judiciary to express their opinion on issues 
affecting the functioning of courts12. The same principle can be applied to 
collaboration between the legislator and the Constitutional Court. 
Amendments of 3 June 2010 into the Law “On Judicial Power” found a 
Judicial Council [Latvian -Tieslietu padome], which is a collegiate institution of the 
judicial power that participates in elaboration of the policy and strategy of the judicial 
system, as well as improvement of organization of functioning of the judicial system. 
Supposedly, it would give a feasible contribution into strengthening of the judicial 
power, including independence of the Constitutional Court. 
The requirement of independence of a judge included in the Constitution, the 
requirement that a court shall be funded from the State budget included in Section 37 
of the Constitutional Court Law and Section 117 of the Law “On Judicial Power” and 
the reference that the State shall guarantee independence of courts included in Section 
10 of the Law “On Judicial Power” serve as the basis for the Constitutional Court’s 
financial and administrative autonomy. Moreover, abiding by the principle of the 
division of power included in the Constitution and the requirement of the 
independence of judges, as well as other internationally recognised requirements, the 
legislator in Section 117 of the Law “On Judicial Power” has provided that the state, 
by envisaging an appropriate funding, guarantees an effective legal protection of a 
person in a competent and independent court. Therefore only such funding of the 
judiciary, which ensures the fulfilment of these duties, complies with the 
Constitution13. 
The Constitutional Court has indicated in the judgment of 18 January 2010 
that the principle of separation of power prohibits the executive power to decide upon 
issues, which directly influence the actions of judiciary and the functioning of courts, 
i.e., the issues of funding, the number of judges, the necessary staff, its competence 
requirements, remuneration and other issues. The budget is a means for implementing 
the policy of the state and decisions concerning the state budget can be taken only and 
solely by the legislator. Consequently, the right to decide on issues related with 
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budget of courts and other issues that influence functioning of courts even if this right 
is not absolute, is granted to the legislator14. 
Disregarding the fact that the Law “On State Budget” is adopted by the 
legislator and the Constitutional Court’s budget constitutes a separate section of the 
State budget, up to now, unfortunately, the normative regulation permits the Cabinet 
of Ministers (the executive power) to introduce amendments into budgetary request of 
the Constitutional Court without reason and consent of the Court, i.e. to decide on 
budget of the judicial power, including on that of the Constitutional Court. 
Moreover, no such collaboration and mutual respect between branches of the 
State power that follows from the principle of separation of powers and independence 
of judiciary has yet been achieved  because the legislation did not provide for any 
procedure, according to which the legislator, before taking any decision regarding 
functioning of courts, would give the possibility to the judicial power or an 
independent institution representing the judicial power to express its opinion on issues 
that influence functioning of courts. Although observance of such procedure follows 
from the principle of separation of powers and that of the independence of courts 
included in the Constitution, neither the legislator, nor the executive power has yet 
observed and ensured observance of such procedure. 
On 1 August of this year, amendments to the Law “On Judicial Power” came 
into force. Section 89.11 Indent 1 of the Law provides that the Judicial Council shall 
provide opinion on budgetary request of courts. There is no doubt that this norm 
would not eliminate all deficiencies of the legislation, however, this should 
necessarily be regarded as a positive step towards facilitation of cooperation of 
branches of the State power. 
National economic problems have negative effects for the judiciary, and 
lately even more than for others. During the last two years, the workload of the 
Constitutional Court has increased at a considerable rate15. Researches made on these 
trends show the number of applications in the future would not decrease. 
Consequently, it is necessary to find solutions for the problem. It does not surprise 
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anyone that the increasing workload of ordinary courts makes them form 
accumulations of cases. As to the Constitutional Court, cases are not accumulated not 
only because this would cause infringement of the right to a fair court, but also 
because the law establishes strict terms for examination of cases. In order to avoid 
loss of high quality due to the increasing workload, the Constitutional Court is now 
trying to find solutions. 
One of possible solutions is increase of the number of employees of the 
Constitutional Court and maybe this should be also applied to the number of justices. 
The Constitutional Court has the power to select, appoint and dismiss staff – both the 
academic auxiliary staff and the non-judicial officials of the Constitutional Court. 
However, this requires additional resources, allocation of which depends on the 
legislator and the executive power. Former endeavours to persuade other branches of 
the State power on possible risks in case if the Court would no more be able to ensure 
fulfilment of its functions due to lack of financial resources, have been unsuccessful. 
Probably, the course of solving of this problem would show the level of 
independence of the Constitutional Court and judiciary. The budget of the 
Constitutional Court as one of determining factors of its independence is still perhaps 
the most significant problem. 
 
[3.2] Constitutional Court’s Regulatory Autonomy 
The ability of the Constitutional Court to control its own procedures is seen 
as a crucial element of judicial independence. The Constitutional Court enjoys broad 
discretion in this respect. 
Court’s regulatory autonomy, although indirectly, is influenced by the fact 
that the President of the Constitutional Court who chairs the Constitutional Court sittings, 
organizes the work of the court, represents the Constitutional Court and has the right to give 
orders to Constitutional Court judges in organizational matters associated with 
fulfilling of the duties of office, is elected, by secret ballot, from among the Constitutional 
Court judges.  
 
[3.2.1] The ability of the Constitutional Court to control its own 
procedures 
According to Section 26 of the Constitutional Court Law procedures for 
adjudicating matters shall be determined by the Constitutional Court Law and The 
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Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court. Section 14 of the Law accordingly 
provides that the structure and work organisation of the Constitutional Court shall be 
defined by The Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court that are adopted with 
an absolute majority vote of all court members. 
That means the system of constitutional review allows for the organizational 
autonomy of the Constitutional Court on the basis of the Constitution and the 
Constitutional Court Law. In that way the Constitutional Court is authorized to follow 
its own rules related to matters of procedure. 
Moreover – Section 26 of the Constitutional Court Law permits the 
Constitutional Court to decide on other procedural issues not regulated by the Law 
and The Rules of Procedure. 
There is no doubt that The Rules of Procedure and decisions of the 
Constitutional Court must be consistent with the Constitution and the Constitutional 
Court Law.   
The Constitutional Court Law establishes strict terms for adjudication of a 
case. Disregarding this fact that the term of preparation of a case was prolonged by 
two months according to recent amendments in the Constitutional Court Law, the 
average term of examination of a case at the Constitutional Court constitutes nine (9) 
months. In order to be able to organize work of the Court effectively and thus to 
ensure the possibility for justices to take a rest provided by law, the legislator: (1) has 
authorized the Constitutional Court to extend the period of preparation of a cases for 
adjudication whenever this is needed due to objective reasons (particularly 
complicated case) and (2) has granted a Constitutional Court a discretion to plan an 
adjudication of a case, that is, the legislator has established a rather long period from 
an assignments sitting till a court sitting (3 months), as well as, has not established a 
term for summoning an assignment sitting (after a case has been prepared) to decide 




[3.2.2] Right of the Constitutional Court to broaden the claim 
In the examination of a case the Constitutional Court is bound by the limits 
of the claim, i.e., it has to verify the compatibility of the contested provisions with the 
provisions of higher legal force, taking into consideration the argumentation of the 
applicants and the motives and considerations reflected in the applications. 
The Court does not have the right to initiate a case on its own initiative, 
nether it has the right to broaden the claim of the applicant. However, under some 
circumstances the Constitutional Court abiding by the principle of procedural 
economy has decided to broaden the claim.   
For instance, in the “Judges remuneration freeze” case, while this case was 
being prepared and adjudicated, the contested provisions were amended applying the 
reduction of remuneration not only to the year 2009, but also to the years 2010, 2011 
and 2012. 
The Constitutional Court indicated in the judgment that since the “freeze” 
equally applies both to 2009 and to 2010, 2011 and 2012, the new wording of the 
contested provisions, to the extent they prolong the period for “freeze” the salaries, 
essentially maintain the situation of the judges set by the contested provisions for 
several more years. Therefore, abiding by the principle of procedural economy, the 
Constitutional Court has the grounds to broaden the claim and attribute its conclusions 
also to new amendments insofar as they in the same way as the contested provisions 
define the procedure for calculating the judges’ salary also in 2010, 2011 and 201216. 
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[3.2.3] Right of the Constitutional Court to Decide on Termination of 
Judicial Proceedings 
Section 29 of the Constitutional Court Law enumerates cases when the 
Constitutional Court has the right to decide to terminate judicial proceedings. Judicial 
proceedings may be terminated, for example, if the disputed legal norm (act) has 
ceased to be in force; if a legal norm (act), the compliance of which is being disputed, 
has ceased to be in force, if a judgment has been pronounced in another case 
regarding the same subject matter of a claim, and other cases. The list of such cases is 
left open by thus ensuring independence of the Court when deciding on termination of 
judicial proceedings. Moreover, the legislator has conferred the right to the Court to 
decide on termination of judicial proceedings, rather than established it as a duty. 
Consequently, in cases when it is necessary, according to the Court, to precede 
adjudication and adopt a judgment in order to eliminate infringement caused to a 
person, the Court does not terminate proceedings. 
 
[4] Independence of the Individual Justices 
The independence of judges is connected with a number of guarantees: 
guaranteed tenure of the judge (the procedure for appointing or approving judges, the 
qualification necessary for the appointment, guarantees of irremovability, conditions 
for promotion and transfer to another position, conditions for suspending and 
terminating the mandate), the immunity of the judge, financial security (social and 
material guarantees), the institutional (administrative) independence of a judge and 
the actual independence of the judiciary from the political influence of the executive 
power or the legislator. Guarantees of independence of a Constitutional Court justice 
are similar with those given to other judges. These guarantees are included in the 
Constitution, follow from the principles included in the Constitution, are established 
in the Law “On Judicial Power” and the Constitutional Court Law. The Constitutional 
Court has indicated that all these guarantees are closely interlinked, and, if even one 
of them is disproportionally restricted, then the principle of the independence of 
judges is breached and thus the fulfilment of the basic court functions and ensuring 
human rights and freedoms come under threat17. 
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[4.1] System of Appointment of Justices and Qualification  
Requirements and Restrictions 
Taking into account jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, the composition 
of justices presents a balance of all branches of power because, according to Section 4 
of the Constitutional Court Law, the legislator proposes three justices, the executive 
power proposes two and the judicial power proposes two more judges for 
confirmation of them to the position of justices. 
Unlike many other states where exists an unwritten tradition that the party 
that proposes a candidate for the position of a judge consults with the President of the 
Constitutional Court and other professions of the field, there is no such tradition in 
Latvia. Taking into account the fact that judgments of the court are collegiate, it is 
undisputable that this is the Court itself that can prognosticate, in the most precise 
manner, its need for specialists of a particular field in order to ensure the highest 
quality result possible. A positive step into this direction is the fact that one of the 
functions attributed to the recently founded Judicial Council is hearing of candidates 
for the position of a Constitutional Court justice and provision of an opinion to the 
Parliament that confirms these candidates. 
Taking into consideration the status of the judge and the fact that he fulfils 
the function of the administration of justice, the legislator has not only the right, but 
also the duty to set with regard to him or her as the implementer of the judiciary 
special requirements as to the competence, qualification and experience, as well as 
restrictions aimed at ensuring the independence of the judge18. Requirements of 
experience and education for candidates for the position of the Constitutional Court 
justice established in the Law are higher than those of ordinary judges19. Moreover, 
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 Constitutional Court Law 
Section 4. Confirmation of a Constitutional Court judge 
[…] 
(2) Such person may be confirmed as a judge of the Constitutional Court who: 
1) is a citizen of the Republic of Latvia; 
2) has an impeccable reputation; 
3) has reached 40 years of age, on the day when the proposal regarding the confirmation as a judge of 
the Constitutional Court was submitted to the Presidium of the Parliament (Saeima);  
4) has acquired a higher professional or academic education (except the first level professional 
education) in legal science and also a master’s degree (including a higher legal education, which in 
regard to rights is equal to a master’s degree) or a doctorate; and, 
5) has at least 10 years of service in a legal speciality or in a judicial speciality in scientific educational 
work at a scientific or higher educational establishment after acquiring a higher professional or 
academic education (except the first level professional education) in legal science. 
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these requirements have recently been increased. Restrictions for justices of the 
Constitutional Court are the same as those of ordinary judges20. 
 
[4.2] Tenure of Justice 
It has been established in the Constitution that justices of the Constitutional 
Court shall be confirmed for the term established by law. The Constitutional Court 
Law provides that the term of office of a Constitutional Court justice shall be ten 
years. It is established in the Law that one and the same person cannot hold the 
position of a justice for longer than ten consecutive years. 
The restricted term of office of justices can, however, influence 
independence of judges in case if after the term of office the justice has to plan his or 
her future carrier. The Latvian labour market is comparatively small, whereas 
normative acts provide for a range of restrictions for State officials (Constitutional 
Court justices included) after the expiration of the term of office, whilst a justice of 
the Constitutional Court is not provided with any compensation after leaving the 
position. Under such circumstances, at the final stage of the term of office, a state 
official starts looking for another employment, which, in turn, can cause the risk of 
adopting not objective decisions and can affect independence of the justice. There is 
no doubt that it is easier for a professional and high quality justice to be independent 
in such case. 
 
[4.3] Financial Security of Justices 
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In 2010, the Constitutional Court has twice assessed the issue of financial 
independence of justices in cases on remuneration of judges. At the end of the year 
2010, the Court plans adopting one more decision. Arguments included in the 
judgments can be attributed to justices of the Constitutional Court because 
remuneration of the justices of the Constitutional Court, though having been 
established in the Constitutional Court Law, has been included into the common 
system of remuneration of judges.   
An adequate remuneration is one of the elements in judges’ financial 
security. Judges need the financial security as a guarantee against external influence 
and for maintaining their qualification. The financial security of a judge, which 
includes setting a commensurate remuneration, namely, remuneration, social 
guarantees, including pensions, for judges, serves as a guarantee of a proper 
administration of justice and as a ground for setting high requirements to a judge, and 
allows maintaining confidence in his or her competence, independence and fairness. 
Thus, the financial security is an integral element of judges’ independence21. 
The Constitutional Court has indicated in its judgment that the state has the 
obligation to set such remuneration for judges that would be commensurate with the 
status, functions and responsibility of a judge. The safeguarding of judges’ 
remuneration is one of the guarantees of judges’ independence22. 
In 2003 the legislator developed a system of remuneration for judges, which 
was capable of guaranteeing the financial security of judges to the extent needed to 
protect the independence of judges23. The system is pegged to the average monthly 
gross salary of the employees in the state. Thus, the system of judges’ remuneration in 
Latvia has been developed so as to the extent possible avoid the need to amend it24. 
Such a system, typical of the majority of modern democratic states, does not 
provide that the legislator should introduce a special mechanism for reviewing the 
judges’ remuneration in a case, when its real value diminishes. The amount of the 
judges’ salary reflects the remuneration trends within the state. In the period of 
economic growth, when the average salary in the state increases, the judges’ 
remuneration also increases and thus the real value of their remuneration is preserved. 
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Under the conditions of economic recession, when the average salary in the state 
decreases, in the framework of this system the judges’ remuneration also decreases.  
Such a system complies with the balance of the branches of power and 
ensures that the judiciary has no need to discuss with the executive power or the 
legislator the amount of judges’ salary, which could cause threats to the independence 
of the judiciary. At the same time this system is flexible – it ensures adjustment of the 
amount of a judge’s salary to the average remuneration for work in the state. 
To allow the judges to fulfil their functions effectively, complying with the 
requirements of independence and competence, as well as with the set restrictions, the 
legislator, taking into account the requirements defined by international organisations, 
has envisaged to them remuneration not only in the form of concrete salaries, but also 
as social and security guarantees, etc. Thus, the prohibition of decrease applies not 
only to judges’ remuneration. The requirement to safeguard the judges’ remuneration 
and other guarantees follows from the principle of the independence of courts and 
judges, which has the purpose to protect judges from any kind of influence: the 
impact of the legislator, the executive power, institutions and officials, various 
organisations, business entities, legal and natural persons25. 
As it follows from the Constitutional Court’s judgments, the purpose of 
judges’ remuneration is both to ensure the independence and to partially compensate 
for the restrictions set in the law. Moreover, it should be taken into account that a 
judge, who is independent, but lacks adequate qualification, is unable to ensure the 
right to a fair trial, precise interpretation of the laws and the protection of 
constitutional values. Thus, the requirement to ensure an appropriate remuneration to 
a judge is linked not only with the principle of the independence of a judge, but also 
with the qualification and competence requirements set for and the restrictions 
imposed upon a judge26. 
Taking into account the fact that that the question whether, at what extent 
and under what circumstances it is possible to reduce remuneration of judges is still 
an urgent one, the Constitutional Court has drawn attention to conditions that follow 
from the Constitution and that should be taken into account when deciding on the cut 
of salary of judges. First of all, Article 83 of the Constitution contains prohibition to 
decrease the remuneration set for the judges during their term in office and protects 
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the actual value of judges’ remuneration, ordering to retain it. Second, the prohibition 
to decrease the judges’ remuneration during the term in office (mandate) does not 
mean that any actions of the legislator, which, could, possibly, have a negative impact 
upon the judges’ remuneration, are absolutely prohibited, namely, a temporary 
decrease of judges’ remuneration is admissible in the presence of serious, socially 
justifiable reasons and if it is decreased in compliance with the principles enshrined in 
the Constitution27. 
 
[4.4.] Immunity of a Justice and Disciplinary Independence 
According to Section 35 of the Constitutional Court Law, commencement of 
criminal prosecution against a Constitutional Court judge, his or her imprisonment, 
detention, forcible conveyance and subjection to a search shall not be permissible 
without the agreement of the Constitutional Court. 
Disciplinary proceedings in relation to a Constitutional Court judge can be 
initiated with a Constitutional Court decision only in the cases provided for by law. If 
disciplinary proceedings against a justice are initiated, the Constitutional Court shall 
have the right to suspend the term of office of the judge.   
If a Constitutional Court judge is unable to continue to work due to his or 
her state of health, he or she shall be removed from office with a Constitutional Court 
decision. 
If a Constitutional Court judge has breached the restrictions established by 
law, allowed a dishonorable offence that is incompatible with the status of a judge or 
systematically does not fulfill his or her official duties and a disciplinary sanction has 
been imposed on him or her regarding it, he or she may be discharged from office 
with a Constitutional Court decision. 
These statutory requirements ensure independence of judges and also 
establish a rather effective procedure, according to which the Constitutional Court can 
react to possible improper actions of a judge. 
 
[5.] Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
The principle of the separation of power includes the control of the judiciary 
over the legislator and the executive power. Not a single legal provision or an action 
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of the executive power can stay outside the control of the judiciary, if it infringes the 
interests of any person28. The judiciary as a whole and the Constitutional Court as part 
of it has to ensure as complete control of two other branches of power as possible29. 
Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court differs from jurisdiction of other 
courts. It has been established in Article 85 of the Constitution and the Constitutional 
Court Law. The Constitutional Court decides on normative acts adopted by the 
legislator and the executive power. 
The particular role of the Constitutional Court can be precisely established in 
cases wherein, when assessing compliance of a contested norm with the norm of a 
higher force, disputes on competence and other disputes with the legislator, the 
executive power or the judicial power are assessed indirectly. When deciding such 
disputes, the Constitutional Court does not and cannot function as only a part of the 
judiciary, whilst it acts as the highest constitutional supervisor, as an institution that 
has the final say when interpreting the Constitution and ensuring its supremacy. 
There have been several comments on the fact whether, when assessing 
constitutionality of certain norms, judges of the Constitutional Court come to a 
conflict of interests. The Constitutional Court has already assessed norms regarding 
the cut of pensions. Judges to whom these norms did apply also participated in 
adjudication. The Constitutional Court has also assessed the issue regarding the cut of 
salaries of judges, namely, norms that are directly related with justices of the 
Constitutional Court. 
When examining the Case No. 2009-11-01, the Constitutional Court 
assessed and substantiated the rights of the Constitutional Court30. It has been 
indicated in the judgment that  the Constitutional Court as part of the judiciary has to 
ensure as complete control of two other branches of power as possible. The 
Constitutional Court, assessing the compliance of a law with the Constitution, 
implements the principle of supremeness, thus ensuring constitutional fairness. 
Neither the Constitution nor the Constitutional Court Law grant to the Constitutional 
Court the right to refuse to examine the compliance of a law or another legal 
provision with the Constitution, likewise, do not give the rights to anybody to prohibit 
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the Court from fulfilling its functions or to restrict the Court in the fulfilment of its 
functions. Thus the Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to examine the 
constitutionality of a decision adopted by another branch of power even in those cases 
when such decisions affect the judiciary. 
 
Conclusions 
In each state, a constitutional court is a part of the constitutional system, and 
the court plays a substantial role in solving of constitutional problems. Of course, it 
cannot solve any problem; however, it is in the interests of the State to ensure 
existence of an independent and strong constitutional court. Disregarding the fact that 
it would be necessary to improve and supplement norms that regulate mutual relations 
of branches of the State power, judgments of the Constitutional Court plays a 
substantial role to improve the situation (not only to form understanding but also to 
regulate such collaboration, ensuring of the principle of separation of powers and 
independence of the judiciary), provided that the Court has analysed, in these 
judgments, issues related with the principle of separation of powers, collaboration of 
branches of the State power and independence of judges31. Likewise, a great 
importance is also attributed to amendments to the Law “On Judicial Power” 
envisaging establishment of the Judicial Council. Its status enables the Council to 
become a substantial negotiations partner to the legislator, the executive power, when 
strengthening democracy and the rule of law in the State. 
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